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Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
David Orentlicher* 
The legislation “puts into place virtually every cost-control 
reform proposed by physicians, economists, and health policy 
experts.” 
- Peter Orszag and Ezekiel Emanuel1 
"The job of figuring how to cover uninsured people used up all 
the political oxygen that was available.  They didn't have the 
energy for costs." 
- Alan Sager2  
For decades, the U.S. health care system has grappled with two 
key problems — inadequate access to coverage and increasingly unaf-
fordable health care costs.  Paradoxically, the U.S. spends far more of 
its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care than do other eco-
nomically-advanced democracies, yet provides health care insurance 
to fewer of its citizens.3 
During the debate that led to the enactment of the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, public officials recognized the need 
to address the problems of both access and cost, but in the end, the 
Act does far more about increasing access than it does about cutting 
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 1 Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 601, 603 (2010). 
 2 John Dorschner, Cost Issues Remain Despite Healthcare Reforms, MIAMI HERALD, 
Mar. 31, 2010 (quoting Alan Sager). 
 3 TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH PER CAPITA, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/total-expenditure-on-health-per-capita_20758480-ta-
ble2 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011). 
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costs.  And this result is not surprising.  As a matter of politics, it is 
much easier to sell the public on more benefits than greater sacrifice, 
so cost control was largely left to another day.  To be sure, taking a 
wider-coverage-first, cost-containment-second approach is not unique 
to the Affordable Care Act.  Health care reforms typically expand 
access initially and envision cost containment as the next step.  That 
was the approach of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965;4 it also was the 
strategy for Massachusetts when it passed its health care reform in 
2006.5  Still, we are left with the question of whether future Con-
gresses will implement the measures necessary to tame health care 
cost inflation or whether uncontrolled costs will cause the Affordable 
Care Act to unravel. 
I.  THE COST PROBLEM 
For many years, the United States has spent more than other 
countries on health care, and the gap is only widening.  In 2008, for 
example, the U.S. spent more than $7,500 per capita on health care, 
which was more than double what Germany spent and nearly three 
times what New Zealand spent.6  To some extent, it makes sense for 
the U.S. to spend more on health care — as a country’s wealth increas-
es, so does its ability to fund services like health care that can prolong 
life and improve health.  But even as a percentage of GDP, the U.S. 
spends far more than other countries on health care.  In 2008, for ex-
ample, Germany spent at 66 percent of the U.S. level, and New Zeal-
and spent at 61 percent of the U.S. level.7 
It is not only the case that the U.S. spends much more than any-
one else; there also is the problem that the U.S. realizes a smaller re-
turn on its health care dollar.  In one study, researchers compared the 
actual improvement in health in different countries with the potential 
improvement that could have been achieved with the dollars that the 
countries spent.8  By that measure, the U.S. health care system was 
less efficient than the systems in Western European countries like the 
UK, Spain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy; Northern European 
countries like Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Far Eastern countries 
                                                                                                                           
 4 David Blumenthal & James Morone, The Lessons of Success—Revisiting the Medicare 
Story, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2384, 2384, 2388 (2008). 
 5 Jon Kingsdale, Implementing Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: Strategic Lessons 
Learned, 28 HEALTH AFF. w588, w588, w589 (2009). 
 6 OECDILIBRARY, supra note 3, at 1. 
 7 TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
social-issues-migration-health/total-expenditure-on-health_20758480-table1 (last updated Mar. 
11, 2011). 
 8 David B. Evans et al., Comparative Efficiency of National Health Systems: Cross Nation-
al Econometric Analysis, 323 BMJ 307 (2001). 
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like Japan, China and Australia; and Western Hemisphere countries 
like Canada, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.9  
The inefficiency of the health care system is reflected in key sta-
tistics on the quality of health.  Thus, life expectancy in the U.S. trails 
that of Japan, Switzerland, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, Israel, Ger-
many, Greece and the U.K., while the infant mortality rate is higher in 
the U.S.10 
To some extent, U.S. citizens benefit from the higher levels of 
spending.  For example, survival rates for patients with breast or colon 
cancer tend to be higher in the U.S.11  However, in many other ways, 
the greater spending does not translate into better health.  People 
with asthma or diabetes are much more likely to need treatment in a 
hospital at some point during the year in the U.S. than in other coun-
tries.  Americans are more than six times as likely as Canadians to be 
hospitalized for asthma and more than five times as likely as Italians 
to be hospitalized for diabetes.12 
One might suppose that the U.S. gets less bang for its health care 
buck because Americans are not as healthy as citizens of other coun-
tries.  That does not seem to be the explanation either.  Americans are 
more obese than others, often much more so,13 but they also are less 
likely to smoke tobacco or consume alcohol.14  Americans also are 
younger,15 which should mean lower health care costs.  According to 
one study, Americans are overall less healthy than in other economi-
cally-advanced countries, but the additional cost from the greater 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Id. at 309 fig.1. 
 10 LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, TOTAL POPULATION, OECDILIBRARY, http://www. 
oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/life-expectancy-at-birth-total-population_20758 
480-table8 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011); INFANT MORTALITY, OECDILIBRARY, http://www. 
oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/infant-mortality_20758480-table9 (last updated 
Mar. 11, 2011).  
 11 Disparities in Health Expenditure Across OECD Countries: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Aging, 111th Cong., 5 chts.4 & 5 (2009) (statement of Mark Pearson, Head, Health 
Division, OECD), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/34/43800977.pdf.  
 12 Id. at 5 chts.6 & 7. 
 13 OVERWEIGHT OR OBESE FEMALES, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary. 
org/social-issues-migration-health/overweight-or-obese-females_20758480-table15 (last updated 
June 8, 2010); OVERWEIGHT OR OBESE MALES, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
social-issues-migration-health/overweight-or-obese-males_20758480-table16 (last updated June 
8, 2010). 
 14 TOBACCO CONSUMPTION, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-
migration-health/tobacco-consumption_20758480-table14 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011). 
 15 Median Age, CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html (last visited Apr. 1, 
2011).  
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“disease burden” amounted to only $25 billion out of nearly $2 trillion 
in health care spending.16 
If the high U.S. health care costs cannot be explained by a less 
healthy population or greater health benefits from health care spend-
ing, why does the U.S. spend more than other countries?  Costs are 
higher in the U.S. in large part because prices for health care services 
are higher.17  Coronary artery bypass surgery and hip replacements, 
for example, are twice as expensive in the U.S. as in Canada.18  Simi-
larly, physicians are more highly compensated in the U.S.19  While the 
reasons for the higher costs are not entirely clear, experts cite the 
weaker bargaining power of purchasers of health care services in the 
U.S. and the greater bargaining power of sellers of services.  On the 
purchasing side, governments in other countries typically negotiate 
standard fee schedules that apply across the board; private insurers in 
the U.S. have less leverage than governments in their dealings with 
doctors, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies.20  On the selling 
side, mergers and other consolidations of services have enabled hos-
pitals to implement higher charges.21  Physician fees may be driven 
higher in part by the high cost of medical education in the U.S.; doc-
tors in other countries graduate with substantially less educational 
debt.22 
It also appears that U.S. health care costs are high because of 
high numbers of surgical procedures, particularly coronary artery by-
pass surgeries and other cardiovascular procedures.23  Americans also 
are more than twice as likely as citizens of other economically-
advanced countries to have an MRI or CT scan.24 
                                                                                                                           
 16 CARLOS ANGRISANO ET AL., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF HEALTH CARE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 9-11 (Jan. 2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/healthcare/MGI_ 
US_HC_fullreport.pdf.  U.S. health care spending reached $2.5 trillion in 2009.  National Health 
Expenditures 2009 Highlights, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www. 
cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).   
 17 Gerard Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different 
From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 98 (2003). 
 18 CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING: 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 22 (Sept. 17, 2007), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1316&context=key_workplace.  
Price differentials are even greater for countries like India and Thailand, spurring the growth of 
“medical tourism.”  I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the 
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1471-73 (2010). 
 19 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 17-19. 
 20 Anderson et al., supra note 17, at 102. 
 21 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 42. 
 22 Id. at 59. 
 23 Id. at 3 fig.9; Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 
36. 
 24 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 12, 15 figs.12 & 13. 
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There are important structural features of the U.S. health care 
system that foster the high prices and high volumes that characterize 
American health care.  For example, because health care insurance 
covers most of the costs for most Americans, patients become insensi-
tive to the fees they are charged.  When patients pay a co-payment of 
$25, they will desire treatment as long as the value of the treatment to 
the patient is more than $25.  Thus, if a treatment provides a value of 
$50, the patient will want it.  But a treatment with a value of $50 may 
have a total cost of $150 (with the insurer picking up the other $125 of 
the cost) and therefore really is not worth providing.   In short, from 
the perspective of overall social benefits and costs, patients demand 
too much health care.25  
Just as patients have too great an incentive to seek care, physi-
cians and hospitals have too great an incentive to offer care.  Under 
the predominant “fee-for-service” method of reimbursement, provid-
ers of health care are paid more for doing more.26  Whether needed or 
not, a surgical procedure pays very well, and there is good reason to 
think that financial incentives in the U.S. lead physicians to perform 
many unnecessary operations.  As indicated above, U.S. physicians 
perform surgeries at much higher rates than their counterparts in oth-
er countries.  In addition, when researchers compare the practices of 
U.S. physicians in high-procedure communities with the practices of 
U.S. physicians in low-procedure communities, they find that proce-
dure rates are similar when there is strong evidence demonstrating the 
value of the care.  However, when the benefit of the care is less clear, 
it is much more likely to be performed in the high-procedure com-
munities.27  In other words, it appears that the difference between 
high- and low-procedure communities is not that too few procedures 
are performed in the low-procedure communities but that too many 
procedures are performed in the high-procedure communities.  And 
the financial rewards from performing extra procedures likely play a 
major role in the decisions of physicians and hospitals to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Of course, the incentive effects of insurance do not distinguish the U.S. health care 
system from systems in other countries.  There too, insurance encourages patients to demand 
too much health care.  However, other countries employ strategies that counteract the incentive 
effects of insurance.  For example, as mentioned above, governments and insurers in other coun-
tries negotiate less generous fee schedules for reimbursement of physicians and hospitals. 
 26 David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit 
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 158 (1996). 
 27 Elliott S. Fisher et al., Health Care 2009: Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs — 
Lessons from Regional Variation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850-51 (2009). 
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them.  Indeed, when physicians are paid a salary, they are less likely 
to order lab tests, request radiologic scans or perform surgeries.28 
The problem is exacerbated because physicians and hospitals of-
ten find that they lose money when they provide higher-quality, low-
er-cost care.  Preventing the need for hospitalization pays much less 
than does treating a patient in the hospital.  Mt. Sinai Hospital in New 
York learned that lesson after opening clinics for patients with di-
abetes.  Patients treated at the clinics lowered their weight and re-
duced their blood sugar levels.  While the clinics were successful in 
terms of improving patient health, they operated with substantial fis-
cal deficits and ultimately were closed.29  
Other commonly-given explanations for the high costs of care in 
the U.S. are not supported by the data.  For example, the legal costs 
from medical malpractice are less than one percent of total health 
care costs, and defensive medicine also represents a very small part of 
the health care budget.30 
II.  WILL THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT SOLVE THE HEALTH CARE 
COST PROBLEM? 
While the Affordable Care Act includes many different provi-
sions to contain costs, there is a serious question whether those provi-
sions really address the cost problem.  For the most part, the Act does 
not take on the major drivers of higher costs, other than to some ex-
tent through demonstration projects. 
Before looking at the cost-containing provisions of the Afforda-
ble Care Act, it is worth considering the kinds of reforms that would 
be effective at controlling health care spending.  Then we can see 
whether the Act includes potentially effective reforms. 
How might the U.S. respond to the factors that drive health care 
costs higher?  As discussed in the previous section, key factors include 
the existence of health care insurance (which makes patients too in-
sensitive to the costs of their care), fee-for-service reimbursement 
(which makes physicians and other providers of health care too insen-
sitive to the necessity of care), and the relatively weak bargaining 
power of insurance companies (which keeps health care prices too 
high).  Patients are too willing to seek more care, physicians and hos-
                                                                                                                           
 28 David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to Financial Incentives, 322 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1059, 1060-62 (1990). 
 29 Ian Urbina, In the Treatment of Diabetes, Success Often Does Not Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
11, 2006, at A1. 
 30 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 41-42; see also Gerard F. Anderson et al., 
Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 
903, 909-11 (2005). 
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pitals are too willing to provide more care, and prices are too high for 
the care that is provided. 
A. Changing the Incentives for Patients 
A number of commentators believe that health care cost inflation 
can be tamed by giving patients more “skin in the game.”31  If patients 
were to pay a higher percentage of the costs of care at the time they 
decide whether to seek care, they will be less likely to demand too 
much care.  Thus, for example, many employers have adopted health 
savings accounts that include high deductibles;32 most employers also 
have raised patient co-payments or co-insurance percentages.33  Pro-
ponents of patient incentives are correct that raising deductibles, co-
payments, or co-insurance responsibilities will reduce the demand for 
health care. 
However, the potential effectiveness of these incentives is li-
mited.  First, the idea behind patient incentives is to discourage the 
likelihood that patients will seek unnecessary care.  Instead of going 
to the doctor when sick with the common cold, for example, patients 
will more appropriately nurse themselves at home.  But when patients 
reduce their demand for care on account of higher deductibles and 
other fees, they often reduce their demand across the board, for both 
necessary and unnecessary care.34  The individual with abdominal pain 
may hesitate to see a doctor, turning an uncomplicated appendicitis 
into a ruptured appendix that requires a longer hospitalization and 
post-operative recovery.35  Second, patient deductibles, co-payments 
and co-insurance would have to be higher than what would be accept-
able to people to make them truly effective.  Consider, for example, 
the patient faced with coronary artery bypass surgery and a choice 
between a total cost at one hospital of $40,000 and a total cost at 
another hospital of $50,000.  With either hospital, a deductible of even 
$2,500 would be eaten up, so the existence of a high deductible would 
not drive the patient to the cheaper hospital.  Having a 10 or 20 per-
                                                                                                                           
 31 MARK HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 991-93 (7th ed. 2007). 
 32 A deductible refers to the amount of health care costs for which the insured individual is 
responsible before insurance kicks in.  Deductibles in health savings accounts run from $1,000 to 
$2,500.  
 33 Co-payments and co-insurance refer to the patient’s share of health care costs once 
insurance does kick in.  For example, a patient may pay a $25 co-payment toward the cost of a 
visit to a physician and pay 10 percent of the costs of hospital care as co-insurance. 
 34 Melinda B. Buntin et al., Consumer Directed Health Care: Early Evidence About Effects 
On Cost And Quality, 24 HEALTH AFF. w516, w523-25 (2006). 
 35 Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-Related Differences in the Risk of Ruptured Appendix, 
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 444, 446-48 (1994). 
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cent co-insurance rate might make a difference in the patient’s choice 
of hospital, but health care policies typically blunt the impact of co-
insurance by capping a person’s annual out-of-pocket costs.  If a plan 
had a 10 percent co-insurance rate and an annual out-of-pocket cap of 
$2,400 (the cap that I have under my individual health care insurance 
policy at Indiana University), then participants would lose their incen-
tive to consider costs once a procedure’s costs exceeded $24,000.  
Raising the out-of-pocket cap would encourage greater cost sensitivi-
ty, but it also would undermine the very purpose of health care insur-
ance — the protection of individuals from unaffordable health care 
costs. 
Another approach to changing patient incentives is included in 
Section 9001 of the Affordable Care Act, which imposes a so-called 
“Cadillac” tax.  Starting in 2018, there will be a 40 percent tax on 
high-cost health care plans to the extent that the cost of the coverage 
exceeds a threshold amount.  The threshold starts at $10,200 for indi-
viduals and $27,500 for families (which is about double the current 
average cost for health care coverage).36  The threshold amount is ad-
justed upward for health care cost inflation and to take into account 
the higher costs of the purchaser’s risk pool.37  The tax is expected to 
generate revenues of $32 billion in 2018 and 2019.38 
The Section 9001 tax is designed to counteract the tax code’s cur-
rent incentive for employers to offer very expensive health care plans.  
Because health care benefits are not taxed as income, employees can 
use “pre-tax” dollars to purchase their health care insurance.39  For 
people who pay 35 percent of their wages in payroll taxes and federal, 
state and local income taxes, a dollar spent on health care coverage 
costs them only 65 cents in foregone take-home pay.40  
                                                                                                                           
 36 Richard S. Foster, Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act,” as Amended, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 17 (Apr. 22, 2010), 
https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf; LAW, 
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
968-70 (C.C.H. ed., 2010) (explaining ¶ 2205 Excise Tax on High Cost Employer-Sponsored 
Health Coverage). 
 37 Foster, supra note 36, at 17 n.15; LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 36, at 969-71. 
 38 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE Table 2 (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 
113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf. 
 39 While people often think that their employer is paying for their health care benefits, in 
fact, the employer is simply taking part of the worker’s compensation and paying it in the form 
of health care benefits instead of salary.  David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance 
and Universal Coverage: Four Things People Know that Aren't So, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & 
ETHICS 435, 437-38 (2009). 
 40 Jon Gabel et al., Taxing Cadillac Plans May Produce Chevy Results, 29 HEALTH AFF. 
174, 174 (2010). 
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The Section 9001 tax likely will have only a small impact on 
health care costs.  As critics of Cadillac taxes have observed, high-cost 
health care plans do not have high costs because of overly generous 
benefits.  Rather, the high costs reflect the relatively poor health sta-
tus of the workforce covered by the plan and the relatively high health 
care costs of the local community.41 
While changing the incentives for patients does not seem very 
promising, changing the incentives for physicians, hospitals and other 
providers seems more promising. 
B. Changing the Incentives for Physicians and Hospitals 
As discussed, fee-for-service reimbursement encourages physi-
cians and hospitals to provide too much care, and society ends up with 
unnecessarily high costs, as well as a lower quality of care.  According-
ly, replacing fee-for-service reimbursement with salaries or capitation 
fees42 for physicians and fixed budgets for hospitals would delink pro-
vider income from the volume of services provided.  Indeed, by elimi-
nating fee-for-service reimbursement, good preventive care would be 
turned from a financial loser into a financial winner.  If hospitals like 
Mt. Sinai were operating under a fixed budget and they kept patients 
with diabetes from needing expensive hospitalizations, the hospitals 
might increase their profits rather than run deficits. 
Health policy experts also have urged a linkage between reim-
bursement and quality of care.  Instead of paying physicians and hos-
pitals for the amount of care that they provide, insurers would pay for 
health care services on the basis of the results that are achieved.  And 
quality-based, “pay for performance” incentives have become com-
mon in health care in the past decade.43   
In principle, a shift in reward from quantity to quality of care 
makes a good deal of sense and could do much to improve our health 
care system.  However, for many reasons, it is difficult to implement 
quality-based reimbursement in practice: Patients may do well or 
poorly because of the physician’s care or because of factors beyond 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 179-80.  Accordingly, as mentioned, the threshold amount for the tax is higher for 
plans that insure groups with relatively poor health status or who receive care in communities 
with higher health care costs.  Critics of Cadillac taxes also have observed that reducing tax 
subsidies for health care insurance may have a regressive effect (i.e., the higher taxes may 
represent a higher percentage of income for lower-income persons). David U. Himmelstein & 
Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of Taxing Employer-Paid Health Insurance, 361 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. e101 (2009), available at http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=1521.  
 42 With capitation, physicians are paid a fixed amount per patient per year to provide care 
for their patients.  Orentlicher, supra note 26, at 158-59. 
 43 REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE 22 
(Institute of Medicine ed., 2007). 
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the physician’s control, like the patient’s underlying health status, and 
it is not always easy to determine which really mattered for a particu-
lar patient.  For many kinds of care, it can take years to see results.  
And for many kinds of care, we really do not know the optimal ap-
proach.44  While the jury is still out on pay for performance, a recent 
study yielded disappointing results from this approach to compensa-
tion for physicians.45 
Besides changing the form of reimbursement, there is a second 
important way to counteract existing incentives for physicians and 
hospitals to provide too much care.  Currently, the U.S. enjoys an ab-
undance of hospital beds, surgical suites and MRI scanners.  With the 
high capacity, it is too easy for physicians to provide unnecessary hos-
pitalizations, operations or MRI scans.  Even if their financial motive 
is diminished by salaried or capitated reimbursement, physicians still 
may be driven by the inclination to intervene and try to do something 
when a patient is sick.  This behavior can be blunted by reducing 
health care facility capacity.  If hospital beds, surgical suites and MRI 
facilities are closed, physicians will have to become more discriminat-
ing when they decide whether to recommend a diagnostic test or the-
rapeutic procedure.  And data demonstrate that physicians can do a 
good job when faced with lowered capacity.  In communities that have 
closed hospitals, or in hospitals that have closed intensive care unit 
(ICU) beds, physicians hospitalize fewer patients and provide less 
intensive care for those who are hospitalized without compromising 
the quality of patient care.46 
C. Increasing the Bargaining Power of Purchasers of Health Care 
As discussed previously, a key factor in the high U.S. health care 
costs lies in higher U.S. prices for health care.  Accordingly, some ex-
perts support government-sponsored negotiation of standard fee 
schedules that would apply to all physicians and hospitals.  This would 
increase the bargaining power on the purchasing side of health care, 
and prices should be lower, as seen in other countries that have this 
“all-payer” fee regulation.47 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Orentlicher, supra note 26, at 183-86. 
 45 Brian Serumaga et al., Effect of Pay for Performance on the Management and Outcomes 
of Hypertension in the United Kingdom: Interrupted Time Series Study, 342 BRIT. MED. J. d108 
(2011). 
 46 David Orentlicher, Rationing Health Care: It's a Matter of the Health Care System's 
Structure, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 449, 450 (2010). 
 47 Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Systemwide Cost Control — The Missing Link in 
Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1132 (2009). 
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While this approach would likely yield lower prices for health 
care and it might reduce overall health care costs, it would not provide 
a full solution to the cost problem.  If fees are lowered, physicians 
could compensate by trying to make up the difference with a higher 
volume of services.  Indeed, that is what has happened in Japan, 
where patients are more likely to see doctors and receive MRI or CT 
scans than in the U.S.48  Fees can be reduced in response to increases 
in volume, but we would end up solving the cost problem without 
solving the quality problem.  Our problem of high costs and too many 
unnecessary procedures would be converted into a problem of even 
more unnecessary procedures. 
In sum, cost containment will require meaningful structural 
changes in our health care system — in the way we pay physicians and 
hospitals (salary or capitation instead of fee-for-service), in the way 
reimbursement levels are set (a single payment schedule for all insur-
ers instead of multiple schedules for different insurers), and/or in the 
extent to which we supply doctors with hospital beds, MRI scanners 
and other health care facilities. 
As we turn to the Affordable Care Act’s cost-controlling provi-
sions, we will see that they generally do not entail the kinds of struc-
tural changes that will “bend the cost curve.”  Indeed, according to 
estimates, the effect on health care cost inflation will be minimal.  Be-
tween 2015 and 2019, health care costs are expected to rise 6.7 percent 
per year instead of the 6.8 percent projection made before the Act 
was passed.49 
III.  COST CONTAINMENT PROVISIONS 
IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The Affordable Care Act seeks to lower costs through a few 
strategies.  For example, the Act includes cuts in Medicare reim-
bursement, adjustments in Medicare reimbursement based on quality 
of care, and greater cost sharing for Medicare beneficiaries.  However, 
the Act calls for the kinds of major structural reforms that could have 
a substantial impact only through demonstration projects.   
A. Cuts in Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursement 
Under Section 3401 of the Affordable Care Act, hospitals, nurs-
ing homes and other health care facilities will receive fewer dollars 
over the next ten years in Medicare payments.  On an annual basis, 
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Medicare increases its reimbursement rates for health care facilities to 
reflect increases in the operating costs of the facilities.  The Afforda-
ble Care Act maintains the annual reimbursement rate increases, but 
provides for smaller increases by changing the formula for calculating 
the rate increases.  Through these reductions in the annual rate ad-
justment, health care spending should decline by $205 billion between 
2010 and 2019.50 
Under Section 3201 of the Affordable Care Act, $145 billion in 
savings are projected from the Medicare Advantage program.51  Medi-
care Advantage is an option for Medicare recipients to enroll in a pri-
vate health care plan rather than choosing traditional, fee-for-service 
coverage (Part C of Medicare).  While the idea was to provide a 
more-efficient, lower-cost Medicare option, Medicare Advantage 
plans have turned out to be more expensive, with average premiums 
higher than the cost per beneficiary of traditional Medicare.52  The 
higher costs have reflected more generous benefits, lower cost-sharing 
for Medicare beneficiaries and higher administrative costs.53  Under 
the Affordable Care Act, Medicare will reduce payments to Medicare 
Advantage plans. 
Another $64 billion in savings are expected from a reduction in 
disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments under the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs.54  DSH payments are made to hospitals that 
treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients.  Originally, 
Medicare DSH was introduced to compensate hospitals for the higher 
costs of treating low-income patients.  When the cost differential be-
tween low-income and higher-income patients narrowed, the DSH 
payments were justified as a way to maintain access to care for low-
income patients — without the payments, hospitals in low-income 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Foster, supra note 36, at page 3 of Table 3.  The Congressional Budget Office also has 
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areas might not be able to afford to stay open.55  Medicaid DSH was 
created for hospitals with high numbers of uninsured patients to help 
them cover the costs of care for the uninsured.56  With the expansion 
of Medicaid eligibility and the subsidies for low-income individuals to 
purchase health care insurance under the Affordable Care Act, the 
disproportionate share hospitals will see significant growth in reve-
nues.  Hence, their need for subsidies will diminish. 
The reductions in Medicare reimbursement, Medicare Advan-
tage payments and DSH payments are important, but they are not 
designed to address the real drivers of health care costs in the U.S.  
They do not constitute the kinds of needed structural changes that 
were discussed in the preceding section of this article (i.e., elimination 
of fee-for-service reimbursement, adoption of a single payment sche-
dule for all insurers, or a reduction in the number of hospital beds, 
MRI scanners and other health care facilities).57 
B. Greater Cost-Sharing for Medicare Beneficiaries 
In addition to saving money by reducing payments to hospitals 
and insurers, the Affordable Care Act will save money — but only for 
the government — by increasing the cost-sharing obligations of Medi-
care beneficiaries.  Under Section 3402 of the Affordable Care Act, 
premiums for Part B of Medicare will rise for higher-income benefi-
ciaries.  Part B covers physician fees, laboratory fees and other outpa-
tient services, and most Medicare beneficiaries pay 25 percent of the 
Part B premium, with the federal government picking up the other 75 
percent.  Currently, higher-income beneficiaries pay between 35 and 
80 percent of the Part B premium, and the income thresholds at which 
the higher premiums kick in are adjusted each year for inflation.58  
The Affordable Care Act freezes the income thresholds at 2010 levels 
for ten years before resuming the annual adjustments.59  Thus, the Act 
will make more Medicare beneficiaries subject to the higher pre-
miums.  This provision will save an estimated $8 billion.60   However, 
these are savings for the Medicare program but not for the overall 
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health care budget.  Medicare will spend $8 billion less, but Medicare 
beneficiaries will pay $8 billion more for their health care. 
C. Reimbursement Based on Quality of Care 
Reimbursement based on quality of care rather than quantity of 
care has the potential for saving costs by reducing the amount of un-
necessary — or unnecessarily expensive — care provided to patients.  
Accordingly, Section 6301 of the Affordable Care Act establishes the 
“Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute.”61  The Institute is 
designed to promote comparative-effectiveness research (CER), re-
search that evaluates and compares the benefits and risks of two or 
more medical treatments or services.62  Thus, for example, CER might 
demonstrate that for many patients with back pain, spinal surgery 
provides no benefit compared to physical therapy.  The Institute will 
set priorities for funding CER studies, and it will analyze data from 
CER studies and report to the public on the significance of the study 
results.63  While the Institute may not recommend coverage changes 
based on its analyses,64 Medicare and Medicaid may take the analyses 
into account in determining coverage policies.65 
Because of concerns that the Institute could use its authority to 
ration care, the Institute is prohibited from employing a dollars-per-
quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) threshold, and the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs are prohibited from using such a measure as a 
threshold for coverage.66  This prohibition is designed to prevent the 
Institute from assuming a role in the U.S. like that of the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK.  NICE 
evaluates drugs and other treatments to determine their cost-
effectiveness, and the British National Health Service will not cover 
treatments if their cost per QALY is too high.67  Thus, for example, 
treatments are generally covered if they cost no more than £20,000 
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per QALY, and they are rarely covered if they cost more than £30,000 
per QALY.68  The unpopularity of cost-effectiveness thresholds like 
that employed by NICE is illustrated not only by the Affordable Care 
Act’s prohibition on their use but also by the decision in the UK in 
October 2010 to strip NICE of its power to deny coverage of treat-
ments based on QALY thresholds.69 
The Affordable Care Act includes a number of provisions in the 
Medicare program to link reimbursement to quality of care: 
1. Medicare will make incentive payments to hospitals that meet 
specified performance standards.  The performance standards 
could be created for any number of illnesses, but they must at 
least be developed for the treatment of heart attacks, heart fail-
ure and pneumonia, the prevention of complications from sur-
gery, and the prevention of infections transmitted during hospital 
care or the provision of other health care services.70 
2. Medicare will adjust payments to physicians based on the quali-
ty and cost of care that they provide to their patients.71 
3. Medicare will expand its reports to physicians that indicate how 
their use of resources in patient care compares to use by other 
physicians.72  This will help physicians recognize when they are 
providing unnecessarily high or dangerously low levels of care. 
4. Medicare will reduce its payments to hospitals that have high 
numbers of patients who become sicker because of their hospital 
care.73  Many patients become infected or suffer other harms to 
their health from preventable causes during their hospital stays.  
The reductions in payment should spur hospitals to implement 
better precautions to protect patient welfare. 
5. Medicare also will reduce its payments to hospitals that have 
excessive numbers of patients readmitted to the hospital after 
discharge.74  This provision reflects the fact that readmission to 
the hospital shortly after a hospitalization often occurs because 
of inadequate care during the hospitalization. 
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Tying reimbursement to quality of care should blunt the incen-
tives for physicians and hospitals to provide unnecessary care.  How-
ever, as discussed above,75 it is difficult to develop quality-based reim-
bursement policies that are effective, and the track record for quality-
based incentives has been disappointing. 
D. Structural Changes 
Several provisions in the Affordable Care Act have the potential 
for making the kinds of structural changes needed to make a real dif-
ference in health care cost inflation. 
Section 3403 of the Act charges an “Independent Medicare Advi-
sory Board” with developing proposals to keep Medicare spending 
within statutory targets, and the Board’s proposals will automatically 
take effect unless Congress adopts substitute provisions.76 The Board 
may propose changes in reimbursement for physicians and hospitals, 
but its proposals may not ration health care, raise costs to Medicare 
beneficiaries, restrict benefits or modify Medicare eligibility criteria.77  
The Board also will provide Congress with recommendations for 
slowing the growth of health care spending in the private sector.78  The 
Board’s authority commences in 2015, with estimated savings of $24 
billion by 2019.79 
The Advisory Board may achieve substantial savings in the long-
er term, particularly through its authorities to propose changes in 
reimbursement under Medicare and to recommend ways to slow the 
growth of health care spending in the private sector.  However, the 
Board’s design and mandate suggest potential concerns.  Will the 
Board focus on short-term fixes to keep Medicare spending within the 
annual statutory targets rather than long-term changes that really can 
“bend the cost curve?”  Will Congress bypass the Board process and 
authorize increases in funding through independent legislation?  Are 
the limitations on the kinds of proposals that the Board can develop 
too restrictive?  Since cuts in physician reimbursement may become a 
key cost-cutting tool for the Board,80 will the Board’s policies reduce 
patient access to physicians, as physicians opt for the higher payments 
of private-insurance plans? 
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The Affordable Care Act also includes funding for demonstra-
tion projects to test out a number of promising structural reforms in 
health care delivery. 
1. Medicaid and Medicare will test “bundled payments” to cover 
the cost of a patient’s care during a hospitalization and for the 
month following discharge.81  This approach seeks to reduce 
health care costs by giving physicians and hospitals incentives to 
provide more cost-effective care rather than simply more care.  
Because the government will pay a fixed amount to cover all of 
the patient’s care during the hospitalization and post-discharge 
care, hospitals and doctors will lose money if they order unneces-
sary tests or provide unnecessary treatments.  Moreover, they 
will lose money if they deliver inadequate care, and as a result, 
the patient needs to be re-hospitalized shortly after discharge. 
I call this approach “capitation lite” because it draws on the eco-
nomizing incentives of capitation payments, but it does so only 
for individual episodes of hospital care.  Doctors and hospitals 
still can make money by hospitalizing patients who really do not 
need to be in a hospital.  In other words, doctors and hospitals 
will be able to make up in volume what they might lose in lower 
payments per patient. 
2. While bundled payments for hospital care may constitute capi-
tation lite, the Affordable Care Act also will test full capitation 
payments.  Under this demonstration project, Medicaid will se-
lect large safety net hospital systems or networks in five states 
that will be reimbursed with global capitation fees.82  In other 
words, the systems will receive a fixed annual fee per individual 
to cover all of the individual’s health care needs during the year.  
Given the ability of capitated compensation to reduce the incen-
tive for doctors and hospitals to provide too much care, this 
demonstration project could be very important. 
3. Medicaid and Medicare will offer incentives for doctors, other 
professionals and hospitals to form “accountable care organiza-
tions” that will become “accountable for the quality, cost and 
overall care” of beneficiaries assigned to them.  Accountable 
care organizations will receive bonus payments if they meet 
standards for quality while delivering care at a lower cost.83  
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Many health policy experts have promoted accountable care or-
ganizations for their ability to provide comprehensive, coordi-
nated and cost-effective care for patients.84  Because all of a pa-
tient’s caregivers are associated in a single organization, it be-
comes easier for the different caregivers to assume responsibility 
for the patients’ overall care rather than for just their particular 
part of the care.  The Mayo Clinic is an important example of an 
accountable care organization. 
While accountable care organizations promise higher-quality, 
lower-cost care, there are reasons to be concerned as well.  Large 
health care organizations can achieve a substantial level of mar-
ket power and use that power to maintain high prices for their 
services.85 
If successful, the demonstration project reforms could have a ma-
jor impact.  However, because they are demonstration projects, they 
would still have to be expanded to the entire Medicare and Medicaid 
systems.  Moreover, they also would have to be adopted by private 
insurers to have a meaningful effect on overall health care costs. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Affordable Care Act, with its individual mandate to pur-
chase health care, looks very much like health care reform in Massa-
chusetts in its approach to increasing access to health care.86  The Act 
also looks very much like health care reform in Massachusetts in its 
failure to come to grips with the need for health care cost contain-
ment. 
The Massachusetts legislature recognized the need to follow up 
its expansion of coverage with measures to address costs, and the state 
created a Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System in 
2008.87  In 2009, the commission recommended the replacement of 
fee-for-service reimbursement with capitation payments to physicians 
and hospitals that have formed accountable care organizations.88  In 
light of the similarities between the Massachusetts and federal laws, 
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we can expect Congress to follow up in future years with more serious 
efforts to contain health care costs, once the Affordable Care Act’s 
provisions for expanding access to care have been implemented. 
An important question is how future Congresses will respond to 
the need for health care cost containment.  If cost containment is done 
properly, access to health care coverage can be maintained by making 
care more cost-effective.  However, when states have been faced with 
cost pressures in the past, they often have responded by reducing 
access rather than streamlining costs.  Thus, for example, when the 
Oregon Health Plan experienced serious cost problems several years 
ago, it balanced its budget by raising eligibility thresholds and ended 
up with levels of uninsured persons that were comparable to the levels 
seen in Oregon before the Health Plan was implemented.89  Hence, 
this article ends where it started — will Congress implement effective 
cost controls, or will uncontrolled costs cause the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act to unravel? 
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